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The Simple Economics of Civil Procedure
George Priest
I am very happy to be here because I have been very interested throughout my career
in state courts and how they operate. While most ofmy colleagues at Yale Law School,
and in legal academia generally, spend most of their time reading U. S. Supreme Court
opinions or, in the case of Yale Law School, the opinions of one or two Justices, that is
a much too narrow approach. The U. S. Supreme Court is surely important, but I think
it is equally important to try to understand how state courts, and especially state trial
courts, operate. So, I have studied state trial courts for most of my career.
I was involved with the Rand Corporation when it first began its civil justice work
back in the early 1980s. Rand had raised money to study the civil justice system and
asked me for ideas as to how to best use it. I was teaching at UCLA at the time, and went
to lunch with them. I said the best thing that you can do is start gathering statistics on
state trial courts because nobody in legal academia knows a thing about how the state trial
court system operates. There was a book published by Charles Clark, who was then the
Dean of Yale Law School, that looked at state trial courts in Connecticut. I This was one
of the only studies and Clark found the statistics so complicated, that he could come to
very few conclusions. The book contains tables and tables ofstatistics, and concludes
that this is a very difficult subject and somebody will have to do more work on it. That
book was published back in 1937, and was the last anybody heard of that approach. So,
I convinced the Rand Corporation to code up the data on the Cook County/Chicago and
San Francisco trial courts.
I want to begin with some economics and then talk about what these empirical
studies have done. In Economic Analysis ofLaw,2 Richard Posner describes what he calls
a model for litigation; that is, he establishes an economic model for when cases will be
litigated, as opposed to settled, and then examines what can be derived from that model.
This model is very straightforward, and it defines what Posner calls the condition for
litigation:3
PpJ -C +8> PdJ+ C -8.
One side of the inequality represents the
plaintiffs minimum demand, and the other side George Priest, Professor of Law,
represents the defendant's maximum offer. The Yale Law School
simple intuition ofthis inequality is that there will
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be litigation if the minimum amount the plaintiff demands is greater than the maximum
amount the defendant offers. On the other hand, if the defendant is willing to pay in
settlement more than the reservation price demanded by the plaintiff, or equal to the
minimum amount the plaintiffwill accept, then they will settle the case. Pp refers to the
plaintiffs estimate of the likelihood of success, that is, the likelihood, in the plaintiff's
mind, that the plaintiff will win the case. J refers to the expected judgment or stakes of
the case. C is litigation costs. The plaintiff knows that the net return is going to be less
than the expected amount he can win at trial because there are litigation costs, whether
it is a percentage or an absolute amount. These amounts, of course, may not be trivial.
There may also be some costs of settlement, S.
Conversely, the net expected cost of litigation to the defendant is the defendant's
expectation of the probability ofsuccess, Pd, times the judgment, J. We will see here, in
this inequality, that the two estimates ofthe amount at stake are the same. That is usually
not true, which is important for the analysis. If the case goes to trial, the defendant will
have to pay litigation costs, so the net cost to the defendant includes what the defendant's
litigation costs are going to be, minus settlement costs. There is a savings if the parties
settle.
By some very simple algebra made possible by having this J constant, the equation
can be reorganized:4
(Pp -Pd)J>2(C -S).
This is the same inequality as above: that is, there will be litigation rather than settlement
when the difference between the parties' settlement offers, times the stakes of the case,
is greater than the difference between the costs oflitigation, C, and the cost ofsettlement,
S. This is the savings in litigation costs from settling, rather than litigating, the case. The
point ofthis economic model ofwhen cases litigate rather than settle is, ifthe differences
in the parties' expectations of success, times the amount at stake, are greater than the
savings in costs from settling rather than litigating, then the parties will litigate. On the
other hand, if this inequality is reversed and the cost savings from settlement are greater
than the difference between the parties' expectations of success, they will settle.
There are a number of different implications of this model. Obviously, one is that
the plaintiff s expectation of success has to be greater than the defendant's, that is, the
plaintiffhas to be more optimistic than the defendant to justify litigation as long as these
costs are positive. IfPp were less than Pdo the left term would be a negative number, so
it would not be greater than costs because we know litigation costs are greater than
settlement costs. As a general matter, and this is an obvious intuition, parties fail to settle
cases where plaintiffs are more optimistic than defendants about the expectation of
recovery.
Let me talk to you now about some of the empirical work I have done. A lot of
economics is simply putting into somewhat more rigorous form common sense intuitions
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about how people behave, and what the incentives are to behave one way or another.
There is a lot to be learned about how markets operate and how parties interact given
different incentives. This inequality, while it simply shows when cases are going to be
litigated rather than settled, reflects the detenninants ofwhat we might call the market for
litigation.
Litigation resembles a market just like the buying and selling of commodities or
services. It resembles a market in the sense that there are two parties interacting and there
may be a way for them to maximize their returns. One way they can maximize their
returns is by settling, that is, when they settle a case, they save litigation costs. We all
know how costly litigation is. We all know, furthermore, that as an empirical matter a
very small number of cases are actually litigated. I have studied this extensively in the
Chicago courts. Between three and four percent of all cases filed proceed to a jury trial
in the Cook County courts. That statistic has been estimated as true ofotherjurisdictions
as well. Chicago is not really unique in that regard. Why would that be so? It is because,
just as trade in a market, the parties have found it mutually beneficial to agree on some
tenns ofsettlement rather than to expend the costs oflitigation and have a jury or a court
determine who wins or loses.
One paper I did a few years ago looked at court congestion.s The Chicago courts,
on and off since the end of World War II, have been plagued by substantial congestion
leading to long delays between filing and trial. At various times, there have been efforts
to reform the court system and the administration system ofthe Chicago courts, and also
the Illinois courts more generally, over this long period. The question ofcourt congestion
in Chicago has been studied by many different scholars, study groups, and centers for the
study of state courts. This is because the court congestion, at least through the early
1980s, was substantial: Often four to five years elapsed between the filing of a lawsuit
and an actual jury trial.
One of the most important studies was by Hans Zeisel at the University ofChicago,
who did the famous study of the American jury with Harry Kalven.6 Kalven was not
involved in the congestion study, but Zeisel studied the congestion in the Chicago courts.7
He had an idea that a way to solve the congestion problem was to think ofcongestion in
the court system as a form ofa logjam. He used a logjam metaphor. What he found was
that the number ofcases filed was increasing dramatically in the Cook County courts, and
the number of cases processed, through either settlement or trial, was less. He
recommended achieving a form ofcase load currency, or to use his metaphor, to get the
river flowing again, so that the number ofcases coming in was no greater than the number
of cases being processed.
Zeisel also recommended establishing some special procedures to pick off the extra
logs in the log jam to open the flow and have it move again. I do not mean to press the
metaphor too far, he did not press it quite this far, but the idea was to get all these cases
moving efficiently through the system. Zeisel proposed increasing pretrial settlement
efforts, improving the management and administration ofcurrent cases, and bifurcating
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trials. He also recommended simplifying jury deliberations and increasing the number
ofjudges. Of course, since then, many other studies have suggested increasing the use
ofADR, calendaring, and other forms of docket management.
The group working with Zeisel suggested that substantive changes in the law, and
standardization oflegal doctrines might help. For example, they thought the adoption of
the Uniform Commercial Code might take a lot ofcases away and solve problems. In the
early days, it was believed that the adoption of strict products liability, as opposed to
using the negligence standard, might ease court congestion because it would be easier to
try product liability cases.
In most of the jurisdictions where there has been heavy court congestion, the
problem has not gone away. More recent analysis of court congestion has derived the
theory that there is something in the legal culture, the relationship between the attorneys
and the court, that leads to chronic congestion and that some broader mechanism of
changing that legal culture might be helpful. So far, no one has figured out how to change
the basic legal culture to achieve that end.
I looked at efforts in the Chicago and Illinois courts to deal with congestion and what
the effects were, over a twenty-year period during the sixties, seventies, and early
eighties. One year, there was the creation of a court administrator. The next year, the
adoption of a different set of pattern jury instructions. Zeisel recommended impartial
medical experts. I do not think that lasted very long. They built a new courthouse in
Chicago. The next year, the adoption ofbifurcated trials and a summer pretrial program.
The next year, the adoption of seventeen new judgeships. The next year, a total
reorganization ofthe courts. The next year, case management computerization. The year
after that, new Chicago courtrooms. The year after that, increased assignments of
downstate judges to Cook County. The year after that, new Chicago courtrooms. They
adopted, for a while, a specialized malpractice division, although I do not think that
survived. The year after that, ten newjudgeships, then thirty newjudgeships, and eleven
new judgeships, and nine new judgeships. Over this twenty-year period, the number of
judges was basically multiplied by five in the Chicago courts, and all of these other case
management procedures were adopted.
What happened empirically? Because I had these detailed trial data, I was able to
measure the time between filing and trial precisely. During the first part of the period,
which was 1959, there was a delay ofa little less than five years from filing to trial. All
of those reforms were instituted in the years after that. Basically, the graph goes up a
little, up a little more, there is a bit of a drop in the early seventies, it goes down a little,
and then it starts rising again. By the end of the period, the court congestion was no
different than it was at the beginning ofthe period, notwithstanding five times the number
ofjudges plus all of the other procedures that were adopted.
Why would that be true? I think you can learn something about it by going back to
the economic model of when cases are litigated and when they are settled. Court
congestion, or delay, has the effect ofchanging J, the stakes ofthe litigation. In a simple
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economic sense, delay puts a discount rate on J, so J is not simply J, butJ plus an interest
rate, one plus I, or divided by an interest rate multiplied by the period of time, T, the
number ofyears. So J is discounted by interest over the period of time ofdelay. Posner
also discusses this, but I think the economic point is a little different than Posner's. The
delay has the effect of depressing the amount at stake in the litigation. The plaintiff s
minimum demand is not only what the plaintiffexpects to win ifthe plaintiffgoes to trial
but also what that is worth when the plaintiffwins, so the present value ofa payment to
be made five years from now or six years from now is substantially less than the nominal
amount of the judgment, depending on the interest rate.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: First, you are assuming no prejudgment interest on the left
side of the ledger. Secondly, you are also assuming that court delays do not run up the
cost of litigation on the other side of the ledger.
PROFESSOR PRIEST: That is true. It is simple in a number of ways. Those both are
important ways ofmaking the model more complete. You are right, prejudgment interest
will offset this. Ifwe really want to deal with prejudgment interest, we could put that into
the equation at the start so that the initial demands and the initial offers are based upon
an expectation ofwhat that delay will be and what the prejudgment interest will be. That
is correct. Given prejudgment interest, however, delay still reduces the expected value
of a judgment.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Prejudgment interest makes litigation more likely?
PROFESSOR PRIEST: Prejudgment interest increases the stakes and thus increases the
difference between the total amount at stake and what the settlement costs would be, that
is true. An additional complication is that as time goes on, litigation costs may increase
or decrease. They increase to some extent because the lawyer has to monitor the case.
How much they increase is a good question as to how much has to be done prior to the
time that a legitimate trial date is set or expected. Even building those variables into the
expectations, differential delay will have the effect ofadjusting this entire process. The
point is that court congestion is going to have something ofan equilibrium effect, that is,
the longer the delay, even given prejudgment interest and the differential costs from
additional litigation, the lower the total amount at stake will be. Therefore, the likelihood
is greater that the parties will settle the case. The shorter the delay, the greater the amount
ofJ will be, and the greater the chances of litigation by the parties will be because this
difference in expectations is more likely to exceed the difference between litigation and
settlement costs.
This means that all the various efforts to reduce court congestion have a
counterbalancing effect, that is, the more they reduce court congestion, the more they also
reduce settlement and, therefore, increase court congestion. This leads to a kind of
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equilibrium. There will be a counterbalancing effect on the existence ofcourt congestion
because it has an effect on the expectedjudgment ofthe parties, and will then self-correct.
Changes in the legal system to address court congestion will affect the settlement
decisions of the parties, so that the log jam, if you want to call it that, is continuously
recreated.
The logjam is not a perfect metaphor because it is not so much that there are a bunch
of cases that hold up all of the other cases. Rather, the decision to keep the case on the
river, or in the pipeline, is affected by the long-term court congestion. There is no doubt
that when the number ofjudges is increased by five times, more cases will be processed
and more cases will be given the opportunity ofgoing to trial by jury than would be true
otherwise. However, there must be a reason that the number ofjury verdicts actually did
not increase by five times when five times the number of judges were added. This
suggests that there are many other things going on with what judges are doing, but it
affects the underlying settlement practices of the parties.
In the past, Posner used the example ofcongestion on a freeway. If you add another
lane on the freeway, there will be more cars on the freeway and it will self-correct. I think
that is true, but this is a slightly different effect. It is not so much that people decide that
now, because there are more judges, they want to have a jury trial. Rather, because there
are more judges, or because there are simplified procedures, or because the court
administration has been changed to make things process more rapidly, the amount of
delay is lowered, which increases the amountofthejudgmentand increases the likelihood
that the parties, in their negotiating in the market over settlement, will fail to settle.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I do not say this defensively, but the big problem that we
have in Cook County is that there are a limited number of trial attorneys who will come
in with their affidavits and say, "You know, we are with a big firm, but there are only
three trial attorneys." One attorney is on a complicated 12-week medical malpractice
case, or this person is on a products liability case. Surprisingly enough, often it is that the
attorneys are not ready.
Then you say to them, "Well, you have to get ready." Then there is some important
case where a local official was indicted in federal court, and was forced to trial in less
than three months. Now, part of the appeal is that she was denied her own choice of
attorney because the judge said, "I don't care what the lawyer is doing, you're going to
go to trial." So there is a little balancing.
PROFESSOR PRIEST: I do not disagree at all. It is a lot more complicated. Everything
is always more complicated. There are some defendants that have great incentives to
delay, even with the existence and availability ofprejudgment interest, and that will affect
the decisions to litigate as well. It is my view that there is a market feature to all of this,
that is, if the returns were greater to trial attorneys in pressing those cases to trial, then
there would be more trial attorneys. The large firms would free up people, or hire more,
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or recruit from the hinterlands, or find more ways of trying more cases if the incentives
were substantially greater for more trial cases. There are markets in many different
dimensions. This is just one feature of them.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: What is your evidence of this theory? Because it is
absolutely the opposite of my experience. My experience, in terms of delay, is that the
longer you delay, the greater the likelihood ofhaving a trial, and the shorter the delay, the
less likelihood. That has been our court's experience as well. The judges who are the
most current on their cases and get the cases ready for trial have more of them settle.
PROFESSOR PRIEST: Well, a lot of people have written about this, including me. I
would be happy to send you all of this, but the proof of the theory, and of the model,
comes in a variety ofdifferent ways. It comes through aggregate data, not by looking at
any single judge. I do not doubt that there are some sets ofjudges that resolve cases more
rapidly than others. I think they tend to be the decisive judges, meaning both parties can
be convinced that the judge is really going to go ahead with what he or she says, and the
parties can predict what the effect ofthe judge on the outcome ofthe trial is going to be.
To the extent that the parties' differences in their expectations ofthe outcome are reduced
by decisive judges, by knowing what the judge is going to do or by being certain that the
judge is actually going to have a trial on the date that was set, that will also affect how the
parties litigate or settle.
The proofof this comes from roughly thirty or forty large empirical studies. Again,
in this empirical study, there was a drop in the seventies because during that period the
courts increased the jurisdictional amount for the superior trial courts, as opposed to the
lower courts, by a very substantial amount. The amount rose from $5000 to $15,000, so
there was a big flood of cases out of the superior trial courts into the lower courts,
although, over time, that changed and restored the same rate ofdelay as had been true at
the beginning of the period. The period of delay in the lower courts was now much
greater because they had many more cases than they had to deal with before, even though
that eventually equilibrated as well. So, the support comes from this large set ofempirical
studies that has generally supported the model. That is not to say that it is not a complex
matter and that the incentives of lawyers do not make a difference.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: This may not be helpful, but I think ofthe cost oflitigation
as a tax on some activity. Cases that go to trial are cases where the market fails. Strong
cases settle fast. Weak cases go on.
PROFESSOR PRIEST: I agree with that.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: With more complete knowledge and better information,
people know where they are. But, ifyou do not even include all the cases that never even
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get filed, because they settle, it seems to me to be very difficult. Your formulas are great
as a jumping off place to talk about things, but my experience is that generally, the
lawyers or the parties have very divergent ideas about J, the possible judgment.
PROFESSOR PRIEST: I agree.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: There is a comment in the materials you passed out about
that. Posner kind of blows it off, like if people disagree about what the case is worth, it
probably will not settle. That is the case, in my experience.
PROFESSOR PRIEST: I agree. In fact, ifyou do not mind, let me move to the next set,
which relates to this point. This is a more complicated model. I do not want to just spend
time on congestion and J itself alone, or on the assumption that J is equal.
Let me show you some other work I have done to describe some other features of
this. One thing I looked at was the case load of the civil jury, that is, what does the civil
jury do and how does the civil jury spend its time? Again, in academia, actually, in
American life, there is not a lot of attention given to what the civil jury actually does.
There is a great veneration for the civil jury. It is one of the most important institutions
of our democratic system, but what does it actually do, why is it so important, and how
should we think about it?
Putting aside the historical reasons and so forth, there are a number of strong and
powerful public policy justifications for civil juries. One is that there is a thought that the
civil jury brings some sense ofcommunity values to difficult decisions, that the civil jury
is important where there is litigation that implicates complicated, difficult, or uncertain
public values. Certainly there is a sense that the civil jury is a counterpart to the criminal
jury in cases implicating the government, that is, where the government is a litigant. Just
as we want a jury ofcitizens to determine questions of guilt or innocence in the context
of a state prosecution of a citizen, we may also want a jury of citizens in the context of
litigation involving the government to be impartial or to protect the citizenry from
anything the government might do.
Harry Kalven, a teacher of mine, a great man, and a person who is greatly
responsible for the modem veneration of the civil jury, used to argue that the civil jury
was extremely important in cases where judges may not have any particular expertise as
to the effects ofa particular harm, but some sample ofthe citizenry would be able to make
that evaluation. He thought the civil jury was extremely important in libel and slander
cases where the jury would have a better sense of an individual's loss ofreputation. He
also argued that the jury is important in a particular set of personal injury cases. When
someone is disfigured, for example, the model who had her face slashed, the civil jury
would have a sense of what that loss would be in a way that any single judge may not.
Of course, the civil jury also serves as a role in training citizens or committing citizens
to the legal system.
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What does a civil jury actually do? When I studied these Chicago trial court cases
over a twenty-year period, I looked at the nature ofthe cases and particularly the amount
oftime that civil jurors spent on different types ofcases, to see how much aggregate time
is spent on these cases for which it is most compelling to have a civil jury. In this study,
civil juries spent 0.26% oftheir time on libel and slander cases; there are not a lot of libel
and slander cases. Civiljuries spent 0.97% oftheir time on cases where the government
was a litigant. What are the cases where they did spend a lot of time? Auto collisions.
Again, these data are somewhat old, but it is reflective of a more general economic
process. The civil jury spent 63.17% of its time on auto cases; a little less than ten
percent of its time on suits against landlords or suits for being injured on a property;
6.82% on workplace injuries; five percent on products liability; and a little less than three
percent on malpractice.
Again, Harry Kalven made the argument that you may need a civil jury to really
understand not only disfigurement but also serious pain and suffering. How would a
judge have any greater sensitivity ofthat? Civil juries only spent 1.26% oftheir time on
cases involving death, and only 2.93% of their time on cases involving serious
quadriplegia, hemiplegia, or brain damage. Maybe we want a jury of peers, but in fact,
most ofthe jury's time is spent on cases where the injuries are somewhat routine. Juries
spend twenty-four percent of their time on cases where the most serious injury claim is
a fracture; twelve percent when the most serious injury is a sprain or strain, eight percent
on whiplash; and 5.47% when the most serious injury claimed by the plaintiff is a bruise.
Why would we have the civil jury resolving not these cases ofgreat democratic moment
or these cases that implicate the public values as we describe them, but rather, cases
which are, in terms of liability, rather ofa routinized nature, such as these auto collision
cases?
In other countries, for example Canada, they have something called a collision chart.
There is a picture, which sometimes you see on police reports in various cities, where if
one car hits the other at a particular angle, there is a liability assignment as between the
two. They have all ofthese different pictures, and that is it. They do not go to trial over
these matters.
Why would the civil jury end up with cases of this nature in the United States? I
think it relates to the litigation inequality. These types of claims, accidents, or injuries
are ones in which the plaintiff has a reason to believe that he or she can get a certain
amount and he or she is optimistic about that. The defendant believes, or can prove, that
the injury is minimal, or that the accident was routine, and they disagree on the outcome
and go to trial. The principal reason these cases are litigated rather than settled is because
of the uncertainty that remains over the outcome.
This also affects the delay point, for the same reason as before. If it is clear what the
outcome ofthe case will be, the case is much more likely to settle and will probably settle
more quickly than if the case is uncertain. I would not call it a market failure because I
do not know that we want to say that there is some ideal of zero litigation or even that
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there is some ideal of litigation of only a few types of cases. I am severely criticized as
un-American every time I say something like this, but the notion of restricting the
jurisdiction of the civil jury does not seem to me to be anti-democratic on the whole. For
example, if we say we should decide auto collision cases in a different way.
Unfortunately, the first time I raised this proposal was at an American Trial Lawyers
Association convention. It was not very well received. I forgot my American flag pin
that I have to wear when I say that.
It is not the failure of the market. It is how the market operates, given the
institutional conditions that are created here. I am not a critic ofthe jury system in terms
of democratic values, but one of the features of the jury system is that it creates a great
deal ofuncertainty because the sysetem picks people at random who are chosen because
they know nothing about the subject. Ifpotential jurors do know something about the
subject, they are usually challenged or excused from the jury. A process of that nature
creates uncertainty by definition which is why it generates and fosters litigation.
There is another study, which I have not yet published, on the different circuits of
the federal courts which have different procedures as to whether they announce the panel
of judges who will hear a case in advance. For example, in the Second Circuit, the
attorneys do not know who will be on the panel of judges until they walk in the
courtroom. In other circuits, there is some advance notice of who the judges will be.
What is the difference? One thing you can see is that if you know who the judges will
be in advance, the cases are more likely to settle than ifyou do not know who the judges
will be. Why? Because there is greater uncertainty. Ifyou are in the Seventh Circuit and
you know the panel is Posner, Easterbrook, and it doesn't really matter who else, you can
pretty well figure out how your case is going to be decided on the whole. If you have a
good strong economic case, your settlement demand goes up. Conversely, the other
party's settlement offer goes up. Again, I do not mean to claim this economic model
explains everything about litigation, but it does generate implications regarding many
features of our system and how they operate.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: In some of the other sessions, we have talked about risk
aversion. Doesn't your theory have to be measured by that kind of a calculation about
settlements?
PROFESSOR PRIEST: Sure.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: The type of personalities in that situation?
PROFESSOR PRIEST: The risk aversion point is a little complicated. Generally, risk
aversion will have the effect ofdepressing the expected value ofa case, but it depends on
who is uncertain. Ifboth parties are equally uncertain, depending on the direction ofthe
uncertainty, it may increase the difference between the parties' settlement offer or it may
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narrow it. If the plaintiff is more uncertain, that will have the effect of lowering the
plaintiff s demand by the extent of the risk aversion. If you have a repeat litigant
defendant, for example, a product manufacturer or an insurer, there will be less risk
aversion by that party, and, therefore, there is a greater likelihood ofsettlement. It is easy
to model risk aversion, but difficult to use it empirically because it is very hard to have
anything other than a hunch as to what risk aversion means in one context or another.
Let me show you one other study. It is another implication of the impact of
differences between the settlement offers of the parties on the likelihood of litigation.
Again, the basic economic point is that the greater the differences between the
expectations of the parties, the more likely they will litigate rather than settle. If the
parties agree on what the outcome is, they will settle because litigation costs are greater
than settlement costs. The less they disagree, the more likely they are to settle.
When the case lies near the decision standard, there is great uncertainty, or there is
a greater possibility of uncertainty to the parties as to what the outcome is going to be.
This point is really only a variation on what we see in the sports pages every day; the
betting line on a football game, basketball game, or any other type of sporting event. A
betting line on a football game changes the decision standard from who is going to win
to by how much are they going to win. The betting line increases the uncertainty as to the
outcome of the game. If the betting line for the Kansas-Colorado football game is
seventeen points, most people are confidant that Colorado is going to win. The question
is, by how many points is Colorado going to win? The betting line creates greater
uncertainty about that. That is the effect of how litigation operates, too, but there is an
empirical implication of this intuition.
The empirical implication is that this point will hold true whether the decision
standard is the negligence standard, with few plaintiff victories, or the strict liability
standard where plaintiffs win more cases. Under either of these standards, there will be
a similar degree of inherent uncertainty about some set of cases. It follows from this
proposition that, holding everything equal, plaintiffs will win at trial fifty percent of the
time regardless of the decision standard. I looked at the Cook County courts' rate of
plaintiff victories in contested civil cases, and I tried to cull out those cases involving
litigation over damages only. Again, the implication ofthis theory is that the results are,
on average, at the midpoint of the parties' expectations. The Cook County courts'
proportion ofplaintiffvictories in contested civil cases is within the range offifty percent
year after year.
This is not true for all types ofcases because it is a little more complicated, and there
are sets ofcases in which parties have different incentives. For example, when there are
repeat players or when one ofthe parties has more at stake than the other, the incentives
for litigation are different. In products liability and malpractice cases, the defendant has
a greater stake in the case than any single plaintiff. This will lead to a situation in which
the defendant will be more likely to settle those cases in which the defendant is going to
lose and more likely to litigate those cases in which the defendant thinks he or she is
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going to win.
In products liability cases in the Chicago courts, plaintiffs do not win fifty percent
ofthe time. They only win about forty-two percent ofthe time. This figure is consistent
over the years, under both the negligence standard and the strict liability standard. The
strict liability standard did not change the rate ofplaintiffvictories in the Chicago courts,
and there are many other studies that show it has not changed at all anywhere. Products
liability standards have changed: that is, we know manufacturers are held liable today for
things that are far different from what they were held liable for in the fifties or sixties.
The nature of the cases has changed very dramatically, but the actual rate of plaintiff
victories has not. In Chicago malpractice cases, thirty-nine percent of plaintiffs won,
again, very consistently over time; this is true across jurisdictions, within a percentage
point or two. This suggests that the cases that come to trial are not representative of the
entire set of disputes in our society but, rather, reflect uncertainty over the outcome.
Again, it is not that the market fails in a sense. Rather, these are the conditions for
the market in litigation. One can only say the market fails if we wanted to change those
conditions. I am not sure we shouldn't change the conditions in some way, for example,
by constraining the scope ofthe jury. The market is working. According to this model,
cases are litigated when there is great uncertainty as to the outcome. Generally, when the
stakes are higher and when there are differences between the parties' expectations,
different types of cases will be litigated. That will be affected by prejudgment interest,
delay, and the prospects oflitigation and settlement costs. I think it is not a failure ofthe
market, but rather a definition of the market, and we can learn how the market for
litigation operates from this economic model.
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